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Part I: Administrative Law Issues
Patents as Incomplete Contracts:
Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with




A. Patents as Contracts: Incentives for Investment in R&D
Biotechnology inventions synthesized through recombinant DNA
technology, such as genetically-modified crops and hormones, are the
products of large investments in research and development (R&D).1
By conferring rights to the inventor to exclude others from making,
using, or selling a patented invention without a license, patents
provide incentives for inventors to invest in costly and risky R&D.2
Patents also encourage the dissemination of information about new
inventions, thus permitting competitors to build upon or develop
improved versions of patented inventions. While patents create
* Assistant Professor, College of Law and Institute of Government and Public Affairs,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The financial support of the University of Illinois
Campus Research Board is gratefully acknowledged. I am grateful to the participants of the
symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions.
** Graduate student, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1. For a good review of the science and business of biotechnology and its relationship to
the patent system, see Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the
Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 5-24 (1991).
2. For discussions on the various economic incentive-based theories of patent protection,
see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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incentives for investment in R&D, they also impose social costs such
as reduced levels of competition or wasteful design-around efforts by
competitors. Thus, efficient patent systems aim to induce investment
in R&D while limiting losses due to market power.
The fact that market power can be mitigated by limiting the scope
of patent protection influences patent enforcement policy. This
mitigation is accomplished by granting narrowly defined patents as
opposed to broad ones and by maintaining post-issuance
opportunities to invalidate patents that fail to meet the statutory
requirements of patentability— including novelty, utility,
nonobviousness, and enablement. While these strategies increase
public welfare by creating more competitive markets, they also create
uncertain property rights that make it more difficult for patent holders
to appropriate the surplus of their inventions. Weak or uncertain
intellectual property rights may thus reduce incentives for investment
in high technology R&D.3
Patent policy makers must consider not only the elements that
distort perfect competition, but also the ways in which a policy
distorts investment incentives for R&D. In this Article we propose
that viewing patents as incomplete contracts is a useful means to
analyze the relationship between legal institutions of patent
enforcement and investment in R&D. It is helpful for one to consider
first why many view a patent as a contract: in exchange for disclosure
of the invention, the public’s agent, the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (PTO), grants the patentee a limited right to exclude others
from making selling or using the invention. Thus, the quid pro quo of
the patent system provides the patentee with a limited property right
in exchange for adequate disclosure about the invention. Describing
patents as contracts also suggests that policy makers should apply the
Coase theorem to propose an optimal patent policy.4 Patent policy
that creates well-defined property rights leads to efficient use of
social resources, such that new innovations will be introduced to
3. See JEAN O. LANJOUW & MARK SCHANKERMAN, PATENT SUITS: DO THEY DISTORT
RESEARCH INCENTIVES? (1998) (noting that patent infringement suits in our legal system dilute
and distort R&D incentives).
4. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 25 (1959) (outlining the
importance of rules for fixing initial allocations of resources with which parties can bargain for
exchanges to increase joint profits).
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meet society’s demand for new technology. While analyzing patent
policy in the same way as other property rights is an attractive
proposition, several differences between patents and other property
rights are crucial.
Patents, unlike many other property rights, may be rescinded after
they have been granted. Patents may be rescinded either because the
patent may be invalidated or the scope of patent protection may be
modified in post-issuance litigation. Thus, a patent may be viewed as
a contingent property right. Investors in R&D projects will view the
patent in terms of a probabilistic property right, where the probability
of invalidation reduces the expected return of an R&D investment
project.5 Another important distinction has to do with the R&D
process itself: an investor must commit to R&D expenditure without
knowing whether the benefits of the project will accrue to the
patentee because the patent still runs the risk of invalidation. Such
information may be costly to obtain prior to investing, because the
investor does not know enough about the invention until it is made.
Therefore, the public cannot “contract” with the inventor to create a
new invention but instead must establish patent enforcement rules by
which a patent may be invalidated. As Coase envisioned, such rules
may be difficult to specify in sufficient detail so as to work in the
same manner as a property right.
We propose that patents are incomplete contracts because they
create contingent property rights, which in turn reduce incentives for
investment in R&D. Reduced levels of R&D investment retard the
rate at which new technologies are delivered to the public.6 The
literature on this slowed rate (hold-up) explains reductions in
investment of specific capital in terms of opportunistic behavior or
informational asymmetry.7 We wish to distinguish these losses from
the losses that occur as a result of the gap-filling of incomplete
contracts between the patentee and the PTO. The gap-filling or
5. See LANJOUW & SCHANKERMAN, supra note 3.
6. See id. (noting that incentives for R&D and entry are weakened by patent enforcement
systems).
7. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233
(1979).
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default rules correspond to the substantive rules in patent law that
allow opportunities for invalidating a patent.8 In other words, these
default rules confer broad residual rights to the public to invalidate a
patent through post-issuance litigation.
The theoretical model developed here applies to and builds on
Grossman and Hart’s model of incomplete contracts in the patent
system and the process of technology commercialization.9 We view
the inventor and the PTO as vertical partners in a technology
commercialization process that ranges from R&D investment to
patent issuance. The decision variables in this process are the amount
of prior art disclosed during patent prosecution and the presumption
of validity accorded to the prior art disclosed by the patentee.
We begin by defining incomplete contracts and then introduce the
technology commercialization process in Section II. In Section III we
develop the model, and in Section IV we apply it to analyze the
impact of different patent policies in high and low (or well-
established) technology fields of invention.
Our core insight in this Article is the following: in the case of high
technology patents where the PTO is poorly informed about the
relevant prior art, it may be optimal for the PTO to provide incentives
to the patentee to produce a complete prior art disclosure. Such
incentives could accord a specific, high presumption of validity10 to
the disclosed prior art, thereby limiting the use of the disclosed prior
art for invalidation purposes in subsequent (i.e., post-issuance)
litigation. We show that a regime that trades a reduction in post-
issuance litigation uncertainty for a complete prior art disclosure
maximizes social welfare because it benefits both the patentee and
the PTO. The patentee favorably views the reduction in litigation
uncertainty and greater control over the possibility of patent
invalidation, which induces higher levels of ex ante investment in
8. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
9. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
10. The presumption of validity that we are proposing is different from the general
presumption of validity associated with every granted patent in 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994). Under
our proposed presumption of validity to be specifically accorded to disclosed prior art, a court
will not invalidate a patent based on disclosed prior art unless it is convinced that no reasonable
examiner would have allowed the patent in light of the disclosed prior art.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/3
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R&D. From the public’s perspective a fuller prior art disclosure may
allow the PTO to grant patent rights commensurate with innovation
and to avoid the detrimental consequences of an overbroad patent
grant.11 In sum, this proposal is an incentive-compatible trade that
maximizes joint social surplus.
B. Incomplete Contracts Defined
Economists and legal scholars have used the term “incomplete
contract” differently. The legal appreciation for incomplete contracts
has been in understanding how the rights and obligations of each
party remain unspecified as a result of gaps in the literal language of
a contract. A contract is “obligationally” or literally incomplete if
some of the details of the contract, such as price, delivery time, or
technical specifications remain unspecified for a set of circumstances
in which the contract is to apply.12 In this regard, much of the legal
focus on incomplete contracts is in determining the gap-filling role
courts should play in specifying the default rules (such as good faith)
that apply to contracts.
Default rules eliminate literal incompleteness by specifying the
terms of a contract when the parties fail to do so. Any contract is thus
made literally complete as a result of default rules that attach to an
incomplete contract. Default rules may take the form of general terms
that specify price, delivery date, or other details outside specific
terms of the contract.
On the other hand, the economist’s definition of incomplete
contracts refers to the ex post efficiency of contractual outcomes.
Does the contract allow the joint surplus of the parties to be
maximized by taking into consideration the buyer’s marginal
valuation of the good and the seller’s cost? A contract is
economically incomplete if it fails to induce Pareto-improving trade
in all of the relevant contractual contingencies. Such contracts are
11. Here we are assuming that the PTO is able to appreciate the import of the prior art
disclosed to it by the patentee.
12. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). See also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)
[hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps].
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thus “state contingent” incomplete because the immutable terms of
the contract prevent parties from engaging in mutually beneficial
trade.13 Economic incompleteness is viewed with reference to “states
of the world” because these factors determine a buyer’s willingness
to pay and a seller’s costs. For instance, the value of a gallon of water
will be higher to the buyer during a drought than during a flood. Yet,
if a contract fixes the price of water (either through literal
specification or by default rules) at a price that does not vary with the
weather, the market will not clear, leaving some buyers unserved or
creating a glut in all but a small range of prices. These outcomes are
not ex post efficient because both parties could benefit (buyer could
get water, seller could get a better price) if the contract terms were
renegotiated. The contract is therefore economically incomplete
because it does not lead to an ex post efficient outcome.
Only relatively recently did legal audiences consider this form of
incompleteness, that is the efficiency considerations of trading rules,
in deciding the role the courts should play in gap-filling or in the
interpretation of default rules. For example, Hadfield analyzes the
roles efficiency-minded courts should play in determining the
damages for breach when they are limitedly competent.14 She
proposes that even a limitedly informed court can enhance welfare by
enforcing a liability standard, as opposed to a bright line rule,
because the former induces changes in the contracting partner’s ex
ante behavior, while the latter does not.15 In a similar vein, Ayres and
Gertner have argued against the conventional wisdom that courts
should enforce terms that maximize the joint surplus of the parties.16
They contend that courts should maintain penalty defaults against the
more informed party to a contract, so as to induce the parties to reveal
13. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 12. See also Benjamin E. Hermalin &
Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More
Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230 (1993).
14. Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete
Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994).
15. Id.
16. In this case the surplus refers to the profits of the parties to the contract, given that
investments have already been made. In this model, we consider the case where joint surplus is
increased as a result of incentives to invest in surplus-enhancing activities, such as R&D. See
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 12. See also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation
Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/3
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information that would lead to ex post efficient contracts.17 These
studies emphasize foremost that the terms of the contract itself can
have important effects on ex post efficiency, as a result of the parties’
means of dealing with literal incompleteness.
The relationship between literal incompleteness and economic
incompleteness, therefore, depends on the role default rules play in
filling the gaps of incomplete contracts. Contracts that avail
themselves of many forms of literal incompleteness leave many gaps
to be filled by default rules. To the extent that default rules create
inefficient outcomes (because thin markets are created), literal
incompleteness results in economic incompleteness. However,
economic incompleteness may result from the court’s inability to
verify whether certain actions have been performed as desired by the
contracting parties (for example, whether all relevant prior art known
to the patentee has been disclosed during the course of patent
prosecution to the PTO).
The premise of Grossman and Hart’s incomplete contracts theory
of ownership is non-verifiability.18 In this model, a literally
incomplete contract results because some activities of the contract
may be observable to the person undertaking them yet are non-
verifiable to the courts. These activities are what they term “non
contractibles.”19 Gaps of literal incompleteness are filled not by
default rules but rather by “residual rights” that enable one party to
essentially specify the default rules that apply in contingencies
outside the literal terms of the contract. Problems of verifiability are
typically observed in the case of a two-stage production process,
where optimal production decisions of the second stage are
contingent upon the outcome of the first stage. A contract between
the upstream and the downstream partner may be economically
incomplete if it fails to induce the upstream (stage-one) partner from
making investments that maximize the joint surplus of the parties. If
the contributions of the upstream partner are observable but not
verifiable to the courts, as when the technology is not separable, or
the task to be performed is not programmable, the upstream partner
17. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 12.
18. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 9.
19. Id.
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will not have any basis to appropriate the benefits from the diligent
performance of his duties. The principal-agent model views this
result as incentive incompatible. However, the important distinction
is that the upstream partner, anticipating that the benefits will be
appropriated by the downstream partner, will be reluctant to make
surplus-enhancing investments in the first place.
Grossman and Hart suggest that an allocation of residual rights to
the upstream partner would reduce this economic incompleteness.20
In the following section, we build on this approach of optimal
ownership by proposing that the R&D and patenting process can also
be viewed as a vertical relationship between the patentee (inventor)
and the PTO (public).
C. Patents as Incomplete Contracts
The R&D and patenting process includes many of the sources of
economic incompleteness described above. A patent may be viewed
as a literally incomplete contract whose gaps are filled by rules of
patent enforcement. These rules apply to prosecution, infringement,
and invalidation. Patents can be economically incomplete contracts
because the patent prosecution process may not make full use of the
patentee’s information about, for example, the novelty of the
invention, and because the process does not provide adequate
incentives for the patentee to reveal such information.
The R&D and patenting process also may be considered a joint
production problem, where the patentee’s investment in R&D and
resulting claims of novelty are non-verifiable. One important
distinction, however, is that the R&D investments that a patentee
makes do not necessarily improve the surplus (as in the case of the
relationship-specific capital assumed in the models of hold-up) to be
shared by the patentee and the public. Such investments merely
increase the chances of producing that surplus because the outcomes
of R&D projects are not deterministic. Although the formal model we
develop in this Article relies substantially on this latter view of R&D
and the patenting process as a joint production problem, the notions
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to the patenting process.21
A patent is literally incomplete because invalidating prior art
under the statutory standards is subject to judicial discretion.22
Section 102 of Title 35 of the United States Code requires that an
invention be new in order for it to be patentable.23 If the invention has
been described in a printed publication anywhere in the world more
than twelve months prior to the filing date of a patent, the patent may
be rendered invalid in post-issuance litigation.24 Courts have ruled
that a printed publication must be accessible to the public in order to
invalidate prior art under section 102. However, the meaning of a
“printed publication accessible to the public” is subject to judicial
discretion. For example, in In re Hall the courts ruled that a doctoral
dissertation catalogued in library archives constituted a printed
publication within the grasp of the public’s knowledge, even though
it may not have been actually accessible to an inventor or scientist.25
A patent may be viewed as an incomplete contract because the
courts can attach a different legal significance to the claims of a
patent after it has been issued. In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co., the court invalidated Amgen’s claim over any
DNA segment that would encode for a hormone that stimulates red
blood cell production, on the ground that the specification did not
enable the broad scope of patent protection sought by Amgen.26 In
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., the plaintiff asserted that
Calgene’s FLAVR SAVR brand tomatoes incorporated genetic
antisense technology that was covered in Enzo’s patents.27 However,
the court held that Enzo’s claims of infringement were not
substantiated because the actual use of the Enzo patent was limited to
antisense technology in E. coli, because the patent did not provide
enabling information for use in plants and animals.28
One can view outcomes such as these as cases where institutions
21. See infra Parts II and III.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 102(b).
25. 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
26. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
27. 14 F. Supp.2d 536, 541 (D. Del. 1998).
28. Id. at 541-70.
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of patent enforcement create economically incomplete contracts,
because literal incompleteness compels the court to resort to default
rules. These rules allow a patent to be invalidated by several different
contingencies not anticipated during patent prosecution. In the
hypothetical situation of complete contracting, there would have been
no uncertainty as to whether a prior art reference would render a
patent invalid. Thus, reducing the extent of incompleteness in the
patent contract would allow greater investment in R&D projects
without incurring risks of being unable to appropriate the benefits of
the project. In contrast, greater incompleteness in the patent contract
creates opportunities for this type of ex post hold up, reducing the ex
ante incentives for investment in R&D.29
A patent may be invalidated or the scope of a claim reduced as a
result of incomplete or imperfect information about the state of the
art. In this model, we suppose that in the case of high technology
fields of invention, the patentee and the PTO are asymmetrically
informed about the relevant prior art. Lack of knowledge about the
prior art results in inefficient contracting between the patentee and
the PTO, because the PTO, not being aware of such prior art
(especially non-patent art), may grant overbroad claims for
inventions already within the grasp of the public.30 This information
asymmetry thus allows the patentee to collect an information rent in
the form of a license fee for a claim in a patent that may not be valid.
In addition, competitors and improvers may expend resources to
design around potentially invalid claims. When patent claims are
granted for inventions already known to the public, they create
disincentives for follow-on innovation. These disincentives ought not
to exist as an initial matter because the public already knows the
subject matter of the invention.
Litigation costs to invalidate such unwarranted patents also
29. See LANJOUW & SCHANKERMAN, supra note 3.
30. See Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999)
(noting that there is a vast amount of non-patent prior art in the software-implemented business
concept field that is unknown to the PTO); see also Andrew M. Riddles & Brenda Pomerance,
Software Patentee Must Conduct Own Search: Prior-Art Searches Made by the Patent Office
Often Are Not Thorough Enough To Be Trusted, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 26, 1998, at C19 (stating that
the PTO is just a “registration process” for some types of software patents).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/3
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exacerbate welfare losses due to imperfect or asymmetric
information. A patentee, holding a patent that could be invalidated in
post-issuance litigation, may decide to set a license fee that is lower
than the cost of litigation (i.e., a sub-litigation cost license fee).31 A
potential infringer, not wishing to bear the risk and costs of litigation,
may pay the license fee for an unenforceable patent.32 As long as the
costs of litigation and information acquisition for other infringers are
significant, a patentee may continue to collect several small license
fees. Indeed, as Lanjouw and Schankerman have shown, one of the
determinants of the probability that a patent will be challenged is the
size of the stakes, which corresponds to the license fee.33 High license
fees will make the costs of litigation and prior art retrieval
worthwhile for potential infringers. Low license fees, in contrast,
allow the patentee to escape invalidation by discouraging attempts to
invalidate a patent.
Considerations like these inform firms’ decisions whether to
invest in R&D. Models of expected utility maximization, however,
do not capture the important effects of public policies, such as rules
of patent enforcement. Investing in an R&D project is different from
an optimal lottery strategy, because institutions of patent policy could
allow the inventor to have control over the probability of exploiting a
valid patent (in other words, the probability of post-issuance patent
invalidation). The control referred to here may manifest itself in
terms of the prior art information the patentee can disclose to the
PTO during prosecution. Thus, we are concerned with how patent
policies that permit such tradeoffs might effect the initial decision to
invest in R&D. We describe this in the context of the overall R&D
and patenting process, which we refer to as the technology
commercialization process.
31. J. Beckwith Burr, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property in the Information
Age, 41 VILL. L. REV. 193, 204 (1996) (stating that with the high cost of defending patent
infringement lawsuits, “many improvidently granted patents are likely to go unchallenged”).
32. Id.
33. See LANJOUW & SCHANKERMAN, supra note 3.
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II. PATENTS AND THE TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION PROCESS
A new invention begins as an investment project. The expected
value of the invention depends on the outcome of initial R&D efforts,
the probability of obtaining valuable property rights protecting the
invention (a patent), and the probability of successfully exploiting
that property right (market success). This sequence is described in
Figure 1. At time 0, the inventor evaluates the alternatives for
investment in R&D projects based on their expected net profits, given
the public’s specification of the terms of the patent regime (a2) (e.g.,
duration, eligible subject matter for patent protection) and makes an
R&D investment (a1). If the results of R&D are successful
(probability S1), the inventor applies for a patent and obtains one with
a probability S2 at time 2. Once a patent is obtained, the invention
creates an expected revenue stream of monopoly rents or licensing
fees for the duration of the patent. However, the validity,
enforceability, and scope of protection of a patent may be challenged
in court (with probability (1-S3)) after it has been issued on a variety
of grounds (e.g., inability to meet the requirements for patentability),
if such evidence is presented to the court in post-issuance litigation.
The disclosure of prior art during patent prosecution and the
presumption of validity accorded to the disclosed prior art are two
factors that effect a patent’s validity and thus its ability to generate
benefit streams. Each of these may be considered decision variables
in the technology commercialization process illustrated below.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/3
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 A. Disclosure of Prior Art During Prosecution
The prior art is the basis for determining whether the invention
sought to be patented meets statutory requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness. For example, if a prior art reference, such as a
scientific publication or a printed document, demonstrates that the
invention has been used anywhere in the world twelve months prior
to the patentee’s filing date, the invention is statutorily barred from
being patented.34 Prior art disclosure provides benefits for both the
public and the PTO, albeit for different reasons. A complete prior art
disclosure reduces the probability (S3) that a patent will be
invalidated in post-issuance litigation, since it allows the PTO to
evaluate a larger set of prior art references that could be used to later
invalidate the patent. A patent granted based on a more complete
disclosure of prior art is less likely to be invalidated, because it
reduces the number of references that will have not been previously
considered by the PTO, thus benefiting the patentee.35
The public benefits from a complete prior art disclosure because it
allows the PTO to grant claims of proper scope that are
commensurate with the extent of innovation due to better information
regarding the state of the art. Complete disclosure can be particularly
important in high technology sectors where the PTO may not have
access to all of the prior art that is available to the inventor.36 The
PTO, not being an expert in the field and having limited resources,
may not be able to access all the relevant prior art compared to the
inventor, who is typically an expert in the field.37 This is especially
true where the relevant prior art is non-patent art such as scientific
publications, or the relevant prior art information is already in the
public domain, as in the case of computer software. In the context of
34. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
35. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA L.Q. 185, 194, 234 (1998) (studying 299 patents over an eight-year period
from 1989 to 1996 and finding that the percentage of invalidation based on uncited prior art was
40.8%, but the probability of invalidation based on cited prior art was 29.6%).
36. In this respect, the PTO held public hearings in June of 1999 on the subject of
identifying sources of information for prior art references and preferable methods for gaining
access to prior art in emerging fields, such as computer software and biotechnology.
37. Very few patentees cite any non-patent prior art during the course of prosecution. See
Allison & Lemley, supra note 35, at 231-34.
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the patent quid pro quo, one may view this as creating information
asymmetry between the trading parties, with the PTO as the lesser-
informed party. In contrast, in the case of inventions in low
technology or established technology areas,38 such as the mechanical
arts, the PTO can better ascertain the state of the art. Thus, we
assume that the PTO and the patentee are symmetrically informed in
the case of low technology or established technology inventions.
These assumptions have implications on the nature of the exchange
between the PTO and the patentee. This is clearer when we consider
according a high presumption of validity for prior art disclosed to the
PTO by the patentee.39
B. Presumption of Validity Accorded to Disclosed Prior Art
If an extensive prior art disclosure is made by the patentee at the
time of patent prosecution, a patent will be difficult to invalidate
because that prior art cannot be the basis for invalidation by the
courts in post-issuance litigation.40 While a more complete prior art
disclosure decreases the probability of invalidation, a high
presumption of validity also reduces the probability of invalidation.
This presumption restricts the opportunities for the courts in post-
issuance litigation to attach a different legal significance to the prior
art. For the patentee a high presumption of validity accorded to
38. By low technology inventions, we have in mind simple mechanical inventions such as
a new type of corkscrew. The social benefits conferred by such devices is likely to be smaller
than those produced by a high technology invention such as a new cure for cancer or AIDS.
39. See supra note 11.
40. There is a presumption of validity for every granted patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1994) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”). The presumption of validity granted to issued
patents is a check on the judiciary in patent cases. See John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts
and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim
Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 219 (1999). The presumption of validity has not been
uniformly applied by the courts, however. See also Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination:
Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 9-11 (1997). 35 U.S.C. § 282 does not grant a strong or weak presumption of validity
with respect to disclosed or undisclosed prior art. As a practical matter, prior art disclosed to the
PTO during prosecution is less likely to be used successfully against the patentee in post-
issuance litigation compared to uncited prior art. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 35, at 231-
34. Nevertheless, cited prior art is used to invalidate a patent a significant percentage of the
time. See id. at 234 (noting that about 30% of the prior art-based patent invalidations rely on
cited prior art).
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disclosed prior art reduces the chance that a patent will be invalidated
as a result of the disclosed prior art taking on different legal
significance. In contrast, under a regime with a low (or non-existent)
presumption of validity for disclosed prior art, prior art disclosed
during prosecution can be reexamined by the courts in a post-
issuance lawsuit (e.g., invalidation or infringement suit) in order to
render the patent invalid. Because this proposal removes the
possibility of reducing market power through post-issuance patent
invalidation, the public may wish to accord a high presumption of
validity only in circumstances where the resulting benefits outweigh
distortions to competition and reductions in incentives for R&D
investment. One such benefit is the creation of a more certain
property right. This right allows investors to undertake more risky
R&D projects, because the expected value of the project is not
reduced further by uncertainty over patent rights.41 The increase in
investment in R&D in high technology projects can outweigh the
social losses in market power, because high technology inventions
often create significant positive externalities that spill over into other
markets. In addition, under a regime that accords a high presumption
of validity for disclosed prior art, the PTO may capitalize on a
complete prior art disclosure and grant patent rights that are
commensurate with the new information in the patent disclosure.
Thus, the PTO would avoid the negative consequences brought about
by an overbroad grant of patent rights.
C. Characterizing Optimal Patent Policies
Optimal patent policy must weigh, among other things, the
inducements provided for investment in R&D against the social costs
imposed by patents. One social cost is the diminished ability to
develop new inventions as a result of a policy that discourages
investment in R&D. Improperly issued patents create difficulties for
inventors that add social costs, including wasteful design-around
41. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual
Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 897, 900 (1988) (noting that a strong
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activities of inventors who try to avoid infringement. The cost of
developing new inventions that incorporate patented inventions
increases if downstream inventors must pay upstream inventors
license fees.42 Existing patents may also raise the financing costs for
R&D projects, because they increase the possibility that the new
invention will infringe upon existing patents. Financiers view this as
raising the risk (or lowering the expected return) of the investment
project and thus command a higher risk premium on loans to
inventors.
In sum, these are the costs of economically incomplete
contracting: A patentee may have access to information relevant to
patentability that the PTO could benefit from. However, the patentee
may decline to reveal the information to the PTO without adequate
incentives.
The doctrine of inequitable conduct43 and the duty to disclose
information material to patentability44 encourage patentees to produce
material prior art to the PTO. Inequitable conduct arises when
information material to patentability is not disclosed to the PTO or
false material information is disclosed to the PTO with an intent to
deceive the PTO.45 However, the level of proof required to establish a
claim of inequitable conduct has been set so high by the Federal
Circuit that it has reduced the incentive to disclose prior art to the
PTO. The Federal Circuit has held that even gross negligence in
failing to disclose prior art is not in itself sufficient to prove an intent
to deceive the PTO.46 Since 1988, the PTO has indicated that it will
neither investigate nor reject patent applications based on violations
of the duty to disclose material prior art, since it is not well-equipped
to make such a determination.47 The Federal Circuit has frowned on
42. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).
43. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kingsdown Med.
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
44. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1999) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution
of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which
includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material
to patentability as defined in this section.”).
45. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
46. Id.
47. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 746 (West
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assertions of inequitable conduct as a defense in patent lawsuits and
charged that the habit of claiming inequitable conduct has “become
an absolute plague.”48 The net result is that there is little incentive to
provide a complete disclosure of the prior art to the PTO. Indeed,
Allison and Lemley report that non-patent prior art was not disclosed
to the PTO in the vast majority of cases they studied over an eight
year period from 1989 to 1996.49 These results indicate that private
information regarding the relevant prior art is not adequately
disclosed to the PTO, because there is no significant incentive for the
patentee to disclose relevant prior art. As a result, in certain technical
areas with significant non-patent prior art, the PTO is not equipped to
determine the scope of the non-obvious contribution made by the
patentee.50
One means of correcting this inadequacy is through a policy that
accords a high presumption of validity to disclosed prior art. This
policy would allow the PTO to exploit the patentee’s private
information by granting claims of proper scope. In high technology
fields of invention, such as biotechnology and computer software, the
problem of asymmetric information is particularly acute, perhaps as a
consequence of imperfect or asymmetric information between the
patentee and the PTO.51
To the extent that increased information allows patents of proper
scope to be granted and reduces the probability of invalidation for the
patentee, it reduces economic incompleteness. This is because both
the public and the patentee are made better off through a “contract”
that allows a high presumption of validity to attach to disclosed prior
art. This is a case where the objectives of the PTO and the patentee
are congruent, and we model this disclosure and patenting process as
a joint production process or a vertical relationship.52
1998).
48. Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that
“the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague”).
49. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 35.
50. See Merges, supra note 30.
51. See infra Part II.A.
52. See Merges, supra note 30 (proposing patent policies such as a patent opposition
system that will efficiently coordinate the efforts of the PTO and private parties to achieve a
socially desirable result). See also Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building and the Useful
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/3
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However, such an analysis does not account for the option value
of being able to retain full rights to invalidate a patent in post-
issuance litigation. Because it may be difficult to ascertain what a
properly defined high technology patent should encompass, the
option of being able to easily invalidate a wrongly-issued patent may
not be negligible. If the PTO finds that a basic patent, on a gene
sequence for example, should never have been issued, the value of
being able to invalidate the patent is removing what could be a
development obstacle for future inventions. In the case of high
technology inventions, if wrongly-issued patents are significant
obstacles to the development of important inventions, this option
value can be high. The public welfare benefits of such an option
value are difficult to determine and most likely vary considerably
across different fields of invention. Accounting for this option value
in a model of incomplete contracts with asymmetric information is a
complex issue since it requires introducing additional assumptions
about the information levels of each party and the value of the
information over time. This model does not attempt to do this. As a
result, we assume that in according a particular presumption of
validity to disclosed prior art, the PTO is conscious of the option
value it gives up in exchange for information from the patentee, and
is capable of appreciating the import of the prior art disclosed by the
patentee. Indeed, a fundamental assumption in our analysis is that the
PTO is capable of appreciating the import of the information
disclosed to it by the patentee. If adequate resources are provided to
the PTO,53 it is reasonable to assume that the PTO will be able to
review prior art that is disclosed to it during prosecution.
III. MODELING PATENTS AS INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
Consider the three-period model described in Fig. 1, in which the
inventor (patentee) invests a0 in R&D at time 0. The patentee also
invests a1 prior to observing the outcome of R&D, in order to assess
Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 765 (1999) (proposing a patent opposition system to achieve greater ex
ante proprietary and competitive certainty).
53. See Merges, supra note 30 (sketching the functions and goals of an ideal patent
office).
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the intellectual property situation in the relevant field. Investment a1
allows the patentee to conduct a complete search of prior art in order
to determine if the R&D project could lead to an infringing product
but also to be able to support claims of novelty and nonobviousness
in a patent application. Since the decision to invest in R&D depends
on the expected profits, a0 is a function of a prior belief about S3, the
probability of holding a valid patent in the post-issuance stage. This
depends on the regimes of patent enforcement employed by the
courts. Hence, we can write a0=a0(S3). In addition, at time 0, the PTO
invests a2 in bureaucratic infrastructure and commits to particular
institutions and practices of patent examination.
The results of investment a0 in R&D initiated at time 0 are
contingent upon the success rate (S1). If R&D is successful the
patentee applies for a patent at time 1. In the course of applying for a
patent, the patentee discloses prior art q1 and makes a claim on
territory not within the prior art. If the patent is issued then the
patentee may exploit the patent by producing the invention and
selling it (presumably at monopoly prices) or licensing it. If a patent
does not issue (probability (1-S2)), the patentee may choose to either
reapply with modifications, appeal the PTO’s decision, or abandon
the project. During the patent application process, the claims may be
negotiated in light of information made available to the PTO either
from the patentee or through its own search. However, obtaining a
patent, does not ensure that the property right is fixed; it may be
invalidated in post-issuance litigation, depending in part on the
presumption of validity (q2) that the public (PTO) has accorded to the
cited prior art.
The process in Figure 1 can be thought of as a two-period
production model in which each party (the patentee and the PTO)
supplies appropriate levels of q1 and q2 in order to bring a new
invention to the market. The disclosed prior art (q1) is non-
contractible in the sense that the public cannot determine whether the
complete prior art known to the public has been disclosed to the PTO.
The presumption of validity accorded to the cited prior art by a court
in post-issuance litigation is a patent policy choice that is known at
time 0. The non-contractibility of q1 creates an opportunity to allocate
residual rights of control over the variables q1 and q2. Hence, one can
ask whether a joint surplus could be increased by allowing one party
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/3
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to control q1 and q2 through the choice of patent policy specified at
time 0. With this question, we define the benefit functions of each
party.
Rents from successful patenting accrue to the inventor for the
duration of the patent with probability S3. The net benefits of
knowledge disseminated to the public (which includes users,
improvers, and competitors) as a result of the patent disclosure are
captured with certainty. The benefit accruing to each party can be
expressed as Bi[a0,aiji(q1,q2)], where i=1 for the inventor and i=2 for
the public. We assume that Bi is increasing in ji for each party. In the
case of the patentee, j1 corresponds to the probability (S3) of having
an enforceable patent. B1 is thus a realization of expected benefits,
given S3. The PTO similarly wishes to maximize j2, which are the
social benefits of patents issued with properly defined scope and
adequate specification (e.g., providing enabling disclosure to
improvers and competitors in addition to maintaining incentives for
R&D).
The problem for the policy maker is, therefore, to decide how to
accord the rights to control q1 and q2 in order to maximize joint
surplus (B1 + B2). To reiterate the problem being modeled, we have
defined the following function representing the joint surplus:
(1) B1[a0, a1, j1(q1,q2)]+B2[a0, a2, j2(q1,q2)]
where the variables are defined as:
a0: ex ante investment in R&D by patentee
a1: ex ante investment in prior art search by patentee
a2: ex ante investment in patent system (salaries and work-load
of patent examiners)
q1: disclosure of known prior art
q2: presumption of validity for cited prior art
B1: patentee benefits (monopoly prices, licensing fees)
B2: public benefits (knowledge disseminated, consumer benefits)
S1: probability of success in R&D
S2: probability of obtaining a patent
S3: probability of holding an enforceable patent
j1: patentee benefits as a result of disclosure (q1) and
presumption of validity (q2)
j2: public benefits from disclosure (q1) and presumption of
validity (q2)
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For simplicity we assume that S3=j1, implying that patentee
benefits of control over q1 and q2 are increased with the probability of
capturing rent streams. Since the present analysis is concerned only
with cases where the patentee patents the product of a successful
R&D project, we assume that S1 and S2 are independent of control
over q1 and q2.
A. Specification of the Model Under High and Low Technology
Environments
The respective benefit functions of the patentee and the PTO will
be different for the case of high technology (e.g., biotechnology or
computer software) and low technology or established technology
inventions, since the costs and the benefits of operating in these
environments differ. These differences are captured in the respective
ji functions that we define as linear combinations of q1 and q2 as
expressed below:
(2) j1= a1q1 + b1q2 + e1C (patentee)
(3) j2= a2q1 + b2q2 + e2C (PTO)
The functions are distinguished by the values for the coefficients
an, bn, and en, which are weights on the relative importance of non-
contractibles (q1) and contractibles (C).54 The magnitude of the
coefficient indicates the relative importance of the factor (hence the
degree to which control will matter), while the sign of the coefficient
indicates whether increases in the value of the variable (q1 or q2)
result in an increase or decrease in benefits. A negative coefficient
indicates that control of the variable by party j adversely affects the
benefit function (ji). This is the case of incongruent objectives. The
differences in the coefficients for the high and low technology sectors
are due to information asymmetries and are explained below.
54. We define contractibles as those elements of patentee or public (PTO) benefits that are
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1. High Technology Sectors
In high technology sectors, R&D techniques evolve rapidly, such
that an inventor, being an expert in the field, has better knowledge of
the state of the art than the PTO. Therefore, in equation (3),
asymmetric information between the patentee and PTO is assumed.
The benefits for the PTO in obtaining a more complete disclosure is
that it will be able to grant claims of proper scope. Thus, the
coefficient a2 will be large and positive. Since overly broad claims
may prevent other inventors from creating improved products or
applying the knowledge disclosed in the patent in new areas, the
public values information about the prior art relatively more than its
right to invalidate a patent. Therefore, the coefficient b2, on the
presumption of validity (q2) accorded to the patent, will be small and
positive.
Because the costs and risks of R&D in high technology are high, a
patent must be stable in order to reduce the post-issuance chances for
invalidation. This stability will offset the high costs of R&D with
high expected profits. Thus, the weight on q2 and b1, will be positive
and large. As the patentee discloses more prior art information, she
increases her chance of obtaining a stable patent. Thus, the weight on
q1 will depend on the degree to which a complete prior art disclosure
can reduce the probability of invalidation. If there is a strong
relationship, as a result of an incentive provided by the PTO, a1 will
be large and positive.55
2. Low Technology or Well-Established Technology Sectors
In low technology sectors, we assume symmetric information
between the patentee and the PTO. Since the PTO can easily identify
the relevant prior art, it will be concerned most with not giving up its
right to invalidate the patent in exchange for information it could
obtain from sources other than the patentee. Thus, for parties with
symmetric information, disclosure of prior art will be relatively
unimportant for both the PTO and the patentee. This is particularly so
55. See infra Section IV.
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because the patentee does not receive any incentives to conduct a
thorough prior art search and disclose it to the PTO. Thus, the
coefficients a1 and a2 will be small and positive indicating that either
party should be indifferent to disclosure by the PTO or the patentee.
Since low technology inventions involve less cost and risk for the
inventor, the PTO would prefer to accord a higher presumption of
validity only when it would induce investment in risky high
technology R&D, creating large social benefits. Therefore, for the
case of low technology inventions, granting a high presumption of
validity reduces j2 by relatively large amounts. Thus, b2 is large and
negative.
Because the probability of success S1 is generally higher in the
low technology case, the expected profits from an R&D project may
be higher for a low technology project. Thus, the low technology
inventor can afford to bear a higher probability of invalidation that
would result from a low presumption of validity. Therefore, the
coefficient b1 is small and positive. Given that both a1 and b1 are
small, most of the weight will be on the contractibles (C) or factors
such as brand names or marketing channel agreements— conditions
not relying on patents or R&D. In this case, e1 will be large. The
assumptions we make on the parameters of each of the ji functions
are summarized in Table 1.
In high technology sectors, a more complete disclosure of prior art
would be Pareto-improving since both coefficients a1 and a2 are
positive and large. Since b2 is small, both parties could benefit from a
policy in which presumption of validity is “traded” for a more
complete disclosure of prior art supplied by the relatively better
informed patentee. Thus, the objectives of the patentee and the PTO
are congruent. For low technology inventions, the objectives will be
incongruent because b2 is a large negative coefficient, indicating that
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Table 1
High Technology Low Technology
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The tradeoff that the PTO must consider is how increases in the
presumption of validity decrease public benefits (B2) by reducing the
opportunities for invalidation and simultaneously increase the
incentives for investment in R&D. These effects are described in
equation (4) below. For low technology inventions, we have the
following relationship:
(4)
This is because the productivity benefits of low technology R&D
are small in relation to the welfare benefits of reducing market power.
Since low technology R&D produces only small shifts of production
frontiers, the welfare benefits of reducing market power by
maintaining a low presumption of validity and preserving post-
issuance invalidation rights offset any benefits that would result from
increased investment in low technology R&D.56 In contrast, for high
technology R&D, we have the following relationship:
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(5)
The effect of increases in R&D thereby outweigh the social losses
due to market power that occur as a result of a high presumption of
validity granted to disclosed prior art. This is because high
technology patents may disclose revolutionary teachings or methods
that the public may build upon or use. The public welfare losses from
having to pay license fees in this case are relatively small in
comparison to the benefits the new technology provides. It should be
clear that equations (4) and (5) are assumptions and not results of this
model. These are consistent with the parameter values of Table 1, in
which it is assumed that each agent maximizes their respective ji
functions. Based on these assumptions, we propose optimal patent
enforcement policies for both high and low technologies.
IV. ANALYZING ALTERNATIVE PATENT POLICIES
We consider two policies, which are distinguished by the
incentives provided by the PTO to the patentee to disclose all
relevant prior art. Policy 1 “trades” a high presumption of validity for
information on prior art that may not be available to the PTO. Under
this policy, prior art disclosed at the time of patent prosecution cannot
be used in subsequent litigation to invalidate the patent, except in
very limited circumstances.57 Thus, the patentee can effectively
reduce the opportunities for invalidation by citing all relevant prior
art to the PTO. Since a high presumption of validity attaches only to
the prior art disclosed by the patentee, we can write q2=q2(q1). Thus,
the benefit functions under Policy 1 are:
(6) j1 =a1q1 + b1q2(q1) + e1C
(7) j1 =a2q1 + b2q2(q1) + e1C
57. A threshold test for invoking disclosed prior art might be the following: A court will
not invalidate a patent based on disclosed prior art unless it is convinced that no reasonable
examiner would have allowed the patent in light of the disclosed prior art. In other words,
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Under Policy 1, the patentee discloses the relevant prior art in
relation to the desired presumption of validity, which we assume to
be high. We denote q1 and q2 under this policy as (q1,q2)=(q¢1, q¢2).
Under Policy 2, there is no such exchange between the patentee and
the PTO. In this case the PTO conducts its own prior art search, and
information known only to the patentee is not accorded any special
legal significance. In other words, the PTO maintains no presumption
of validity with respect to the disclosed prior art. The forms of the ji
functions are exactly as initially specified and are reproduced below
as:
 (8) j1 = a1q1 + b1q2 + e1C
 (9) j2 = a2q1 + b2q2 + e2C
We denote the disclosure of prior art and presumption of validity as
(q1,q2)=(q²1,q²2). The effects of each policy in both high and low
technology scenarios are examined in the next section.
A. Policy 1: High Technology
Given the relative importance of the high presumption of validity
(b1 is large), the patentee maximizes j1 by disclosing as much as
information as possible in order to capitalize on the high presumption
of validity. The patentee’s disclosure and the high presumption of
validity (q¢1, q¢2) maximize j1, but will also approximately maximize
j2, because both b2 and j2 are small. This result occurs because the
patentee is made better off by a policy in which a presumption of
validity attaches to all relevant prior art disclosed to the PTO. The
PTO is also able to accord patent claims of proper scope, in light of
the additional information it receives from the patentee. Policy 1
applied to the case of high technology thus leads to higher joint
surplus, due to coordination between the PTO and the patentee. Since
j1 is increasing in q¢1 and q¢2, such coordination will lead to higher
levels of ex ante investment in R&D by the patentee, which increases
both B1 and B2. Since S3 = S3(j1), increasing the value of the j1
function corresponds to increasing the expected value of the
investment project.
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B. Policy 1: Low or Well-Established Technology
Policy 1 applied to the case of low technology does not maximize
public benefits (B2) because the incentives provided by the PTO are
“wasted” and do not increase the information available to the PTO,
and, therefore, do not offset the losses in j2 caused by a high
presumption of validity. The patentee discloses all prior art, yet the
PTO is symmetrically informed (assumption of low technology),
which implies that q¢1»q²1. Thus, j2 is not maximized but instead
approximately minimized since b2 is large and negative in equation
(7). The increase in j1 is brought about by a high presumption of
validity (note that a1 and b1 are small under this policy). However,
the sum of the public and patentee benefits is small due to the
reduction in public benefits brought about by the high presumption of
validity that is improperly granted in this scenerio.
C. Policy 2: High Technology
By setting a low presumption of validity for prior art, Policy 2
removes the incentive for the patentee to disclose prior art. Since the
PTO conducts its own prior art search, j2 is not maximized because
the PTO is necessarily less informed than the patentee. Thus, q¢1 >
q²1. Hence, the j1 function is not maximized by q²1. Furthermore,
given q¢2 > q²2 and a small negative coefficient (b2), j2 is not
maximized. Because the PTO (or policy maker) “controls” the
presumption of validity (j²1 < j¢1), there will be less investment in a0
under Policy 2 than under Policy 1. This is because, in this model, the
lower level of j1 corresponds to a lower probability of having a valid
patent (S3). Under a policy which accords a low presumption of
validity, the investor’s ex ante assessment of the probability of being
invalidated causes him to assign a lower expected return to the
investment project. This makes investment in high risk (high
technology) projects less attractive than investment in other projects
that have higher private returns but lower social returns (e.g., low
technology projects). Benefits (B1 + B2) are thus not maximized when
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D. Policy 2: Low or Well-Established Technology
With no information asymmetry, a policy that maintains a low
presumption of validity will approximately maximize j2 since the
coefficient b1 is small. Since a1 and b1 are both small, any policy
affecting these variables directly or indirectly will have a small effect
on j1. In this case, Policy 2 is efficient in the sense that it does not
waste the privilege of according a high presumption of validity in
order to induce R&D into low technology inventions. Even though
this maintains a higher probability of invalidation for the patentee, its
effect in reducing incentives for R&D investment is less acute than in
the case of high technology because a higher probability of technical
success (S1) compensates for a lower probability of owning a valid
patent (S3). Policy 2 applied to the case of low technology, therefore,
approximately maximizes B1 + B2 because of the public welfare
benefits it maintains through a low presumption of validity.
V. CONCLUSION
We began with the familiar concept that a patent can be a quid pro
quo between the patentee and the public, trading a limited right to
exclude for an adequate disclosure of the invention. Because of the
legal regimes governing post-issuance patent litigation that allow a
patent to be invalidated by the courts after it has been issued, a patent
may be considered an economically incomplete contract between the
patentee and the public. Describing patents as incomplete contracts
allows us to consider the efficiency effects of alternative patent
policies that allocate control over two variables (prior art and
presumption of validity) to one party.
Our approach in developing a model of patents as incomplete
contracts is to ask whether one can increase the joint surplus of a
partnership if there is coordination achieved by one party taking
partial control of the other’s rights. The answer to this question is not
obvious, because control of rights or assets reduces the bargaining
power over ex post surplus, while it can increase joint benefits if the
objectives of both parties are aligned. We apply this model to the
technology commercialization process where the patentee and the
public (acting through its agent, the PTO) are seen as vertical
Washington University Open Scholarship
29.doc 08/24/00
52 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol.2:23
partners. Thus, this model adopts a systems approach by
incorporating R&D decision making and public policy from the
perspective of each party.
We use the incomplete contracts framework to understand the
welfare tradeoffs of market power and the timely development of
new technologies. We consider two specific patent policies. Under
Policy 1, prior art disclosed by the patentee to the PTO during patent
prosecution is accorded a strong presumption of validity in post-
issuance litigation, limiting the use of cited prior art to invalidate the
patent. Under Policy 2, there is no presumption of validity accorded
to prior art cited by the patentee.
These two policies are considered in the context of low and high
technology environments, which are distinguished by the costs of
invention and the level of information asymmetry between the
patentee and the PTO. In high technology sectors, such as computer
software or biotechnology, the patentee is better informed about the
relevant prior art with respect to an invention, as compared to the
PTO. The high technology sector is further distinguished by the
benefits R&D procure to society, as well as the increased risks
associated with high-tech R&D projects. Given the costs and benefits
of innovation in each scenario, we consider which patent policy could
best maximize joint social surplus.
For the case of high technology inventions, Policy 1 induces
higher levels of ex ante investment in R&D. The public efficiently
trades a strong presumption of validity for information about the prior
art. Since prior art is valued by both parties, Policy 1’s transfer of
residual rights encourages disclosure thereby enhancing welfare.
When the objectives of the patentee and the PTO are not aligned, as
in the case of low or well-established technologies, Policy 1 would
not maximize the public welfare since the costs of reduced
opportunities for the public to invalidate the patent outweigh the
benefits of increases in investment.
For the case of low technology inventions, Policy 2 is optimal,
since it allows the public to curtail losses due to market power by
maintaining opportunities for invalidating a patent. In low technology
inventions, the increased bargaining only slightly reduces incentives
for investment since R&D projects of this type are less expensive and
undertaken with limited regard to patent protection. The main reason
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these policy prescriptions apply is an accounting for the positive
externalities that different technologies create, while assuming that
the benefits from high technology are a result of public policy
incentives. The incomplete contracting framework allows us to view
the patent policy of choosing appropriate incentive schemes as a
function of informational and technical (productivity) considerations.
The optimal policy for high technology inventions, such as in
biotechnology (characterized by asymmetric information and high
productivity effects), provides incentives for well-informed patentees
to reveal information regarding the relevant prior art to the PTO
during patent prosecution. This is consonant with a body of
contracting literature that proposes that when parties are
asymmetrically informed, default rules that penalize the more
informed party will be welfare enhancing by inducing that party to
reveal information.58 However, in our case, we do not impose a
penalty on the better informed party, the patentee. Rather, we permit
a transfer of ex post bargaining rights (i.e., reduce the public’s
residual right to invalidate the patent) in order to induce the better
informed party to reduce the informational asymmetry between the
patentee and the PTO. In this regard, the objectives of the patentee
and the public are mutually aligned since the reduction in ex post
bargaining also creates ex ante incentives for higher R&D
investment.
This simple model assumes that the costs and benefits of
information and different technologies are exogenously determined.
In practice, they are part of a larger problem in which the policy
environment and private strategies evolve together. As new policies
are implemented, decision-makers “update” their R&D investment
decision criteria. Therefore, developing dynamic models for this
process would be a worthy research endeavor but by no means
uncomplicated— investment planning in high technology increasingly
incorporates complex models of resource management. New models
must view R&D organizations not only as rational decision-makers
but also as sources of new capabilities, because the inventive process
in itself disseminates new knowledge through enabling disclosures in
58. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 12.
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patents. These are important factors in high technology R&D, as is
the trade-off between market power and incentives to invest
considered in our model of the technology commercialization
process.
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